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I. Introduction
In early 2015, Netflix aired its original series Daredevil, based on a 
Marvel comic book series by the same name.
1
  Daredevil is the story of a 
blind lawyer with superpowers: a crusader who fought crime despite what 
some might presume was a disability.
2
  Marvel fans often hailed the 
Daredevil character as an important addition to the Marvel family due to 
the representation of disability in a positive light.
3
  Quite a few fans of the 
Daredevil franchise have visual impairments and were looking forward to 
enjoying the Netflix show.  While the show was a success, the Netflix 
release of Daredevil was ironically inaccessible to the visually impaired 
community.  The initial release of Daredevil on Netflix did not include 
audio descriptions to explain the actions occurring onscreen to visually 
impaired users.
4
  Daredevil himself would not have been able to watch the 
show. 
Daredevil was just one illustration of an ongoing problem: most online 
content is inaccessible to visually impaired users even though the 
technology exists to make it accessible.
5
  There is no legal clarity on 
whether and how the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA” or “the 
Act”) applies to online content.  In a challenge brought under the ADA, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that Netflix is not legally required to provide closed 
captioning because the website has no connection to a physical place.
6
  The 
court read the ADA’s accommodation requirements as applying only to 
places of public accommodation that have some connection to a physical 
place.
7
  In contrast, the Massachusetts district court considering a similar 
case held that Netflix is a “place of public accommodation” under the 
ADA, even though it is exclusively online.
8
 
Part I of this paper considers the current status of the ADA and 
explains why statutory interpretation does not clarify whether the ADA 
applies to websites.  Part II looks at the multiple judicial opinions 
considering the application of the ADA to online content.  Specifically, 
1. NPR Staff, After Fan Pressure, Netflix Makes ‘Daredevil’ Accessible to the Blind, NPR 




4. Hope King, Netflix Introduces Audio Descriptions for Visually Impaired, CNN MONEY
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/14/technology/netflix-visually-impaired/. 
5. Id.
6. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. (Cullen II), 600 F. App’x 508, 509 (9th Cir. 2015).
7. Id.
8. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D. Mass. 2012).
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Part II focuses on the development of the “nexus test” by some courts, 
which limits application of the ADA’s accommodation requirements to 
those online providers with a nexus to a physical location.  Part III argues 
that the nexus test is often misapplied and has been ineffective in 
addressing the underlying concerns the ADA was meant to address.  This 
note therefore recommends rejection of the nexus test entirely.  Part IV 
considers possible regulations in addition to more consistent judicial 
interpretations of the ADA, focusing on the Department of Justice’s 2010 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address the problem.  Part IV 
also suggests changes to the Department of Justice’s proposed approach to 
allow for flexibility and better guidance for online service providers to 
effectuate changes to the accessibility of their web content.  It focuses on 
regulatory changes that will effectively address issues in statutory 
interpretation unanswered by the courts and also set guidelines for online 
content providers in creating accessible content. 
II. Current Status of the Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA” or “the Act”) 
aims “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
9
  
Congress intended this comprehensive mandate to provide “clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards” for addressing such discrimination.
10
  
Title III of the Act concerns public accommodations and services operated 
by private entities.
11
  Title III specifically states that “no individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”
12
 
Under the ADA, places of public accommodation have an affirmative 
duty to remove barriers for entry or access to goods and services for 
individuals with disabilities.
13
  Examples of barrier removal include 
building ramps, installing grab bars, lowering telephones, and providing 
auxiliary aids.
14
  The ADA places the legal obligation to remove barriers on 
both landlords and tenants at a place of public accommodation.
15
 
9. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 USC § 12101(b)(1) (2015).
10. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
11. Id. §§ 12181-82.
12. Id. § 12182(a).
13. Id. § 12182.
14. The ADA: Questions and Answers, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/adaqa2.html (last updated Jan. 15, 1997). 
15. Id. Landlords and tenants may decide who will actually make the changes in their lease 
agreement; however, both will be legally responsible.  Id. 
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The Act defines many critical terms, including disabilities, 
discrimination, and place of public accommodation;
16
 nonetheless, the 
definitions are not clear or broad enough to provide easy answers to 
questions posed by certain technological innovations.  For visually 
impaired individuals, a critical question is whether a website is a “place of 
public accommodation” under the Act.  The Act defines public 
accommodation by way of example, listing twelve different types of private 
entities that “are considered public accommodations.”
17
  These private 
entities include theaters, places of public gathering, shopping centers, 
recreational and educational places, and social service establishments.
18
  
The list of categories of places of public accommodation is exhaustive, but 
what types of accommodation fall under each category are not.  The list 
itself simply provides a breadth of examples of what may fall under the 
ADA requirements to remove barriers to access. 
When Congress passed the ADA in 1990, websites were just starting to 
be used by research institutions.
19
  They had not yet become destinations 
for online shopping, social networking, education, and even employment, 
16. § 12182.
17. Id. § 12181(7).
18. The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of
this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce— 
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located 
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually 
occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition 
entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales
or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair
service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance 
office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or
other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency,
or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
Id. 
19. Ali Abrar & Kerry K. Dingle, Note, From Madness to Method: The Americans with
Disabilities Act Meets the Internet, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134 (2009). 
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as they are today.  The ADA was drafted on the cusp of a technology and 
information revolution that Congress did not address, and most likely did 
not foresee.
20
  The question thus became whether the language of the ADA 
is broad enough to cover new kinds of accommodations that did not yet 
exist when the statute was written.  Many websites now serve the function 
of theaters, public gathering areas, shopping centers, and recreational and 
educational services—all private entities that are also places of public 
accommodation.  This paper will first explain how statutory construction 
does not clearly answer the question of whether websites fall under the 
ADA, even though textual support and congressional intent could both 
support a reading of websites as places of public accommodation. 
A. Statutory Construction of the ADA in an Online World
Courts and scholars have used many tools of statutory construction and
interpretation to debate whether the ADA applies to online content.  Some 
courts, using specific intent analysis and textual and dynamic 
interpretation, have concluded that the ADA would apply to online content 
if Congress had thought about legislating for the Internet at that time.  
Other courts, using strict textualism and specific intent, have found against 
the application of the ADA to online content based on the wording of the 
statute.  Although there is ambiguity in the statute, courts should read 
“places of public accommodation” to include websites under the definition 
of places of public accommodations.  This interpretation of the statute is 
most consistent with the purpose of the ADA and also supported by both 
the text and specific intent of its congressional sponsors. 
Looking at the text of the ADA, the statutory prohibition against 
discrimination is limited to any place of public accommodation.  The 
statute specifically states “no individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place 
of public accommodation.”
21
  Under a text-based analysis, the word “place” 
in this phrase might suggest a limitation to physical location.
22
  A similar 
20. Id. at 140.
21. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
22. The text of the statute uses “place of public accommodation” and “public
accommodation” somewhat interchangeably.  However, the operative provision related to 
discrimination specifically restricts discrimination in “places” of public accommodation.  This 
qualification could be read as a limitation on the meaning of public accommodation, but the 
distinction between “public accommodations” and “places of public accommodation” is unclear.  
Due to a lack of statutory distinction between the two, this paper does not address whether 
websites are only “public accommodations” or also “places of public accommodation.” 
However, this textualist argument cuts both ways.  While inclusion of the word “place” could 
limit the relevant operative provision to physical locations, its intermittent use throughout the 
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focus is suggested in the statutory definition of “public accommodations,” 
which sets forth a list of institutions typically embodied in physical 
facilities (especially at the time Congress enacted the statute).
23
  The plain 
meaning of “place” could refer to a physical place, as could the dictionary 
meaning of “place.”  In fact, the first definition listed under “place” in 
Merriam-Webster is “a physical environment . . . physical surroundings.”
24
 
However, the text never specifically excludes “virtual” places from 
“places of public accommodation.”  There is also nothing apparent in the 
specific intent of the ADA to indicate that “virtual” places were exempt 
from application.
25
  Congress specifically noted in the Act
26
 that the list 
should not and would not include every type of public accommodation 
required to comply with Title III of the ADA.
27
 
Employing the textual canon of ejusdem generis, one could argue that 
the examples enumerated as places of accommodation are limited to 
physical structures
28
 and therefore the accessibility requirements only apply 
to physical buildings.  There is no textual indication whether the statute 
should be read to only include physical structures or to extend past the 
physical notion of “place” and the examples listed.  However, this 
interpretation does not seem correct, as it would not cover telephone-based 
services, such as pizza delivery services or telephone travel agencies.  
statute arguably demonstrates that “place” is not meant to refer to a physical place but simply to 
contextualize “public accommodations.”  This interpretation is likely considering the responses 
below from Senator Harkin, the sponsor of the ADA, noting that “place” was not meant to have 
any specific meaning in Title III. 
23. § 12181(7). The statute repeats the word “place” numerous times in listing the types of
private entities that count as public accommodations, including “place of lodging,” “place of 
exhibition entertainment,” “place of public gathering,” “places of public display,” “place of 
recreation,” “place of education,” and “place of exercise.” Id. 
24. Place Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
place (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
25. Virtual places may not have been important enough at the time to even consider
including. 
26. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 100 (1990). “The twelve categories of entities included in
the definition of the term “public accommodation” are exhaustive . . . .  The Committee intends 
that the . . . terminology should be construed liberally, consistent with the intent of the legislation 
that people with disabilities should have equal access to the array of establishments that are 
available to others who do not currently have disabilities.”  Id.  Within each of these categories, 
the legislation only lists a few examples and then, in many cases, adds a phrase including “other” 
entities that are similar in nature.   
27. There is a counter argument to construing the exhaustive list broadly.  The list originally 
contained “other similar entities” after each phrase; however, that was removed before the ADA 
was passed.  One could argue that this provision was removed in order to limit application of the 
ADA to fewer accommodations.  The response is that the provision was removed because it was 
surplusage . One could also argue that removing the word “similar” loosens constraints on catch-
all-terms.  The record and debate transcriptions do not indicate the actual reason for removing the 
phrase. 
28. See supra note 22.
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Many of these businesses are already regulated by the ADA.  Furthermore, 
there are multiple services listed under “public accommodation” that exist 
today in a strictly online setting.  To name just a few examples, 
Netflix.com is arguably a theater under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C); Ted 
Talks are similar to lecture halls under (D); Amazon.com is a shopping 
center under (E); Kayak.com is a travel service under (F); and 
Pokerstars.com is place of recreation under both (I) and (L).  Therefore, 
places already covered until Title III—theaters, shopping centers, travel 
services, places of recreation, and more—could include online variants—
like Netflix, Ted Talks, Kayak, and Pokerstars. 
The best response to the argument above comes from a specific intent 
standpoint.  In 1990, Congress had no occasion to consider whether it 
intended to cover websites under Title III.  Congress could not have 
specifically intended to speak to online content and websites.  This 
reasoning, however, also cuts in favor of applying Title III to online 
content.  Although the list of categories of public accommodations in 42 
USC § 12181(7) is exhaustive,
29
 the specific types of public 
accommodations that fall under each category are not exhaustive.  This 
could be because Congress did not intend to limit the definition of “places 
of public accommodation” beyond a very inclusive list of categories.  In 
other words, Congress intentionally provided a list that could include a 
wide range of changing services. 
Another textual argument for excluding websites from the ADA is that 
the list of public accommodations does not include institutional information 
service providers in existence at the time that could be considered similar 
to websites.  For example, the list does not include providers of 
telecommunications and television services that arguably constitute 
nonphysical places of accommodation.  Access to these services for 
disabled users is not addressed in Title III but is instead addressed in Title 
IV of the ADA.
30
  These services, especially telecommunications services, 
might be more analogous to internet services and provisions of information 
on the World Wide Web than the public accommodations in Title III.  The 
exclusion of these services from Title III, which is for places of public 
accommodation and not information service providers, suggests that 
Congress may not have intended for Title III to govern online access to 
websites as places of public accommodation. 
There are three responses to this argument.  First, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has historically controlled 
telecommunications and television; therefore, the ADA arguably needs a 
29. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2015); see also Abrar & Dingle, supra note 19, at 148 n.117.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2015).
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separate statutory provision for those services, to grant corresponding 
regulatory power to the FCC instead of the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”).
31
  This argument does not preclude Title III from applying to 
online accommodations, especially considering how many websites have 
connections to physical locations that Title III already clearly addresses.  In 
fact, reading Title IV (referring to information service providers) as 
excluding online places of public accommodation from Title III would 
create an odd dichotomy where physical locations are governed by a 
separate statutory section regulating conduct even though the same services 
are offered online.  Second, Title IV of the ADA only applies to “common 
carriers,” which, according to the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ, means 
telephone companies.
32
  Online service providers are not limited to 
telephone companies, and even online telephone service providers may not 
fall under typical definitions of common carriers.  Third, and most 
importantly, although the information used by online service providers 
travels through the Internet—a telecommunications service—the services 
provided on Amazon.com or Pokerstars.com are not telecommunication 
services.
33
  Perhaps broadband providers like Comcast would qualify as 
telecommunication services governed by Title IV; however, Amazon.com 
and Pokerstars.com more clearly constitute online offerings of retail or 
recreational services, both of which are services defined as “public 
accommodations” under Title III. 
An analysis of the text of Title III, even taking into account Title IV, 
still favors a finding that online content and websites are places of public 
accommodation.  Evaluating the specific and general intent of the ADA 
further supports this interpretation. 
B. Moving Past Textual Analysis: Statutory Interpretation of Title III
There are arguments against simply adopting a textualist approach
alone, especially when reading Title III to omit websites would be against 
the intent and purpose of the ADA.  The specific intent of the sponsors of 
the ADA actually weighs in favor of regulating online content under Title 
III. The sponsors noted that places of public accommodation should
include a broad range of goods and services, not simply those enumerated
in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
34
  Senator Tom Harkin, one of those sponsors,
stated in the legislative history that the ADA was meant to have a broader
reach because “discrimination against people with disabilities is not limited
31. A Guide to Disability Rights Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. (July 
2009), http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm#anchor63109. 
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also 47 USC § 153(24) (2015) (defining “information services”).
34. Abrar & Dingle, supra note 19 at 137–38.
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to specific categories of public accommodation.”
35
  Furthermore, Senator 
Harkin argued that courts overemphasize the word “place,” given that the 
original version of the ADA only said “public accommodation” and not 
“place of public accommodation.”
36
  According to him, the only reason for 
the addition of “place of” was to make the language of the ADA echo that 
of “public accommodations” in the Civil Rights Act, making the ADA 
easier to explain and endorse.
37
  The word “place” was not meant to add 
any additional constraints to “public accommodations” under Title III. 
The strongest argument against this is that the actual text of the act 
does include the word “place” without any further clarification. Perhaps 
“place” was not important to the sponsors but it could have been critical for 
those who voted to pass the Act.  Furthermore, even if the ADA was meant 
to cover a broader range of goods and services than those enumerated, it is 
unclear what it should cover and where a court should draw the line.  To 
expand what counts as a “place of physical accommodation” would make it 
difficult to provide adequate notice to private entities regarding whether 
their goods and services were included under the statute.  Inasmuch as the 
purpose of the ADA is to provide “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards,”
38
 interpretations that favor inclusion of websites under the ADA 
might frustrate such a purpose without further statutory or regulatory 
guidance. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the primary purpose of the act 
is not just to provide “clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards” 
for preventing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, but 
rather to relieve disabled individuals of “barriers” to participating in 
everyday activities and services.
39
  To fulfill this purpose then, courts 
should resolve ambiguities in the statutory language in favor of removing 
barriers to access.  Courts should therefore read phrases like “places of 
public accommodation” to include websites, as Congress used broad 
language in order to remove such barriers.  Especially when such a large 
amount of information is now available online, including resources related 
to education and finding jobs, it would defeat Congressional goals to read 
the statute to exclude such basic information from the services that must be 
accessible to individuals regardless of disability. 
The legislative history also suggests that the ADA was not meant to be 
a static regulation but was meant to “keep pace with the rapidly changing 
35. Id.
36. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 
13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 241, 285–86 (2008).  
37. Id. at 286.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2015).
39. Id. at 263, 266, 276.
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technology of the times.”
40
  The Committee Report also noted that 
technology would change over time and public accommodations would 
have to provide aids “which today would not be required because they 
would be held to impose an undue burden on such entities.”
41
  This 
language also supports a more liberal interpretation of “places of public 
accommodation” to include goods and services available online.  The 
response to these arguments is that statements made by a few individuals 
before the Senate or the House do not indicate the inclinations of all of the 
individuals who voted for the ADA. 
While there are arguments against the inclusion of websites as places 
of public accommodation, the stronger arguments support including 
websites in Title III of the ADA.  As Part II of this paper shows, multiple 
courts have reached contrary decisions about whether the ADA applies to 
online content.  Because the ADA would otherwise fail to apply to any new 
technologies, courts should read the statute to apply to online content.  
Even courts that take a stronger textualist approach would be able to find 
support in the text of the ADA to support such an interpretation.  Courts 
should, at the least, acknowledge the ambiguity in the statutory language in 
such cases, leaving room for DOJ regulation in the future.
42
 
III. Current Judicial Status of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Web Accessibility 
For years after the passage of the ADA, there was no discussion 
regarding whether the ADA applied to websites and online content.
43
  In 
2001, Access Now filed suit against Southwest Airlines in the Southern 
District of Florida, forcing the judiciary to finally address the issue.
44
  This 
section addresses the current circuit split in applying Title III to websites as 
places of public accommodation.  It discusses the difficulties in applying 
the nexus test, a test some courts have devised to see if websites are in fact 
40. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 108 (1990)
41. Id.
42. Chevron deference to statutory interpretations by administrative agencies tasked with 
executing the statute trumps any precedent of the United States Courts of Appeals unless the 
court specifically states that under Chevron the statute is unambiguous.  See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–85 (2005).  
43. While there were other cases before 2002, those cases were settled or decided on
grounds that were not related to ADA interpretation.  See Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind v. 
Am. Online, No. 99 CV 12303, 1999 WL 33756896 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 1999) (settling shortly 
after due to AOL agreeing to updates to next version of software); see also Hooks v. OKBridge, 
Inc., No. SA-99-CV-214-EP (W.D. Tex. June 28, 1999) (dismissing originally for ADA scope 
rationale but Fifth Circuit declined to follow that reasoning and dismissed for other reasons). 
44. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002),
appeal dismissed, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (dismissing appeal because claims abandoned 
before or were being raised for the first time on appeal). 
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places of public accommodation.  Finally, this section discusses the 
difficulties of judicial interpretation of Title III and why the judiciary is 
limited in what it can accomplish. 
Access Now argued that Southwest.com, owned by Southwest Airlines, 
violated the ADA because it was inaccessible to visually impaired users.
45
  
The website did not provide alternative text that could be picked up by a 
screen reader to communicate the visual elements of a page to impaired 
users.
46
  Southwest.com provides services such as checking fares, booking 
and altering flight reservations, and accessing flights schedules. Plaintiff 
claimed that Title III applied to Southwest.com because the website was a 
“sales establishment” under the ADA.
47
  Plaintiff cited the First Circuit’s 
decision in Carparts v. Automotive Wholesaler’s, which applied Title III to 




The court in Access Now read the statute narrowly, stating that a place 
of public accommodation must be a physical place and that websites were 
therefore not covered by the ADA.
49
  The court applied a strictly textual 
approach to interpreting the ADA and found the textualist arguments more 
convincing against ADA application to online content.
50
  The court then 
attempted to apply what it called the nexus test to determine whether there 
was a significant connection between the services provided on 
Southwest.com and the physical concrete place of public accommodation.  
The nexus test was based on an Eleventh Circuit decision finding that in 
order to state a claim under Title III, plaintiffs must demonstrate a “nexus 
between the challenged service and the physical premises of the public 
accommodation.”
51
  If there were a significant connection, the ADA might 
require that the website be accessible in order to avoid discrimination in 
access to the physical place of accommodation. 
The Access Now court stated that the plaintiffs did not establish a nexus 
between Southwest.com and a physical, concrete place of public 
accommodation, such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel 
agency.
52
  Although the court recognized that websites function as 
45. Id. at 1314–15.
46. Id. at 1316.
47. Id. at 1318.
48. Id. at 1319 (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New 
England, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
49. Id. at 1318.
50. Id. at 1317–19.
51. Id. at 1320 (citing Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 n. 6 (11th Cir.
2002)). 
52. Id. at 1321
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metaphorical spaces, it concluded that the ADA applies only to physical 
spaces: 
[T]he Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have both
recognized that the Internet is “a unique medium—known to its
users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular geographical
location . . . .”  Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that
Southwest’s website impedes their access to a specific, physical,
concrete space such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel
agency.
53
Access Now was the first in a series of cases to analyze the application 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act to online content; however, the 
court’s use of the nexus test was not adopted by other courts as they faced 
similar issues. 
A. Understanding the Nexus Test
Access Now was the first time the nexus test was applied in an online
context.
54
  Now, that test has become somewhat commonplace in judicial 
assessments of the application of the ADA to websites and online content.
55
  
However, as this section discusses, the application of the test has led to 
inconsistent results that bear no relation to the purpose of the ADA.  Under 
the nexus test, the ADA would not apply to websites that do not have a 
connection to a physical place of accommodation, leaving many places of 
public accommodation inaccessible to visually impaired users and only 
affecting already-accessible places. 
The nexus test originated in contexts outside of the Internet as a test for 
deciding what specific activities and services the ADA could regulate.
56
  It 
was not meant to apply to websites or the virtual world, which partially 
accounts for its misapplication now.  In Rendon v. Valleycrest Products, 
plaintiffs argued that the television show “Who Wants to Be A 
Millionaire?” discriminated against visually and hearing impaired 
individuals.
57
  Plaintiffs stated that the screening process for the show, 
which required quickly answering questions on the phone using a keypad, 
discriminated against them in violation of the ADA.
58
  Defendants argued 
53. Id. at 1318–21 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997)).
54. Id. at 1319–21.
55. Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the
“Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963, 972–78 (2004). 
56. Id. at 973.
57. 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
58. Id. at 1286.
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that the ADA did not apply to the contestant hotline because the hotline 
was not a physical barrier.
59
  The Eleventh Circuit found that the ADA 
covered “both tangible and intangible barriers . . . such as eligibility 
requirements and screening rules or discriminatory policies and procedures 
that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s 
goods, services, and privileges.”
60
  Because there was a connection 
between a physical place of public accommodation and inaccessible goods 
or services, the court concluded that the ADA applied.
61
  While Rendon 
was not related to online content, Access Now started applying the test to 
web accessibility.  As the next section discusses, after the Access Now 
ruling in 2002, multiple courts began using the nexus test in cases 
involving the application of the ADA to websites. 
B. Challenges in Application of the Nexus Test
Continued application of the nexus test began to show its
shortcomings.  As this section discusses, the test allows for a broad range 
of judicial interpretation and is not in line with either of the ADA purposes: 
1) creating clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards; and 2)
ensuring access for impaired individuals.  There is too much room for
conflicting judicial interpretation in applying the nexus test.  As seen
above, Access Now was already partially indicative of that failure.  After
the case was decided, multiple scholars argued that there was a clear nexus
between the services Southwest.com offered and the physical flights users
would be boarding.
62
  None of the services offered on Southwest.com were
exclusively available online and all of the services relied on the physical
world of Southwest flights.  Furthermore, the physical corollaries of
Southwest.com were arguably the Southwest ticket counters accessible at
multiple airports.
Confusion as to what counts as a “nexus” continued to plague courts 
after Access Now.  In National Federation of the Blind v. Target, filed in 
2006 in the Northern District of California, plaintiffs stated that Target.com 
was not accessible to blind individuals using alternative text readers.
63
  
Plaintiffs claimed that visually impaired users were thus denied full and 
equal access to Target stores under the ADA.
64
  The court agreed with this 
interpretation of the ADA and the plaintiffs’ application of the nexus test, 
59. Id. at 1283.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1286.
62. Moberly, supra note 55, at 992.
63. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949–50 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
64. Plaintiffs argued that critical information about the physical stores, such as location,
hours, and services available, were all listed on Target.com. Id. 
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stating that a user’s access to goods and services in a physical store were 
impacted by an inability to access the Target.com website.
65
 
The court noted that the purpose of the ADA “is broader than mere 
physical access—seeking to bar actions or omissions which impair a 
disabled person’s ‘full enjoyment’ of services or goods of a covered 
accommodation . . . [i]ndeed, the statute expressly states that the denial of 
equal ‘participation’ or the provision of ‘separate benefit[s]’ are actionable 
under Title III.”
66
  Unlike Access Now, the Target court found that there 
was enough of a nexus to the physical location because the website 
included information about the physical Target stores. 
A comparison of Access Now and Target demonstrates the inconsistent 
results of applying the nexus test.  The nexus test is easy to misapply, 
leading to results that are out of line with the purpose of the ADA.  
Southwest.com does in fact have a link to a physical service in the form of 
a flight and thus would seemingly satisfy the nexus test.  Most flights are 
now purchased through online ticketing services and not at a physical ticket 
counter.  If the ADA should cover any type of website, it seems that a 
website that is a direct gateway to accessing a physical service such as 
transportation should qualify.  Therefore, the Access Now ruling shows 
how the nexus test fails in its own goal of applying the ADA to places with 
a significant physical connection to the online service.  Furthermore, the 
ruling does not even come close to meeting the purpose of the ADA as a 
whole, instead fortifying barriers to access for impaired users. 
The Target case, on the other hand, errs on the other side.  Most of the 
services available on Target.com are actually fully available at physical 
Target stores.  The information on the website that the court claims creates 
a nexus to the physical store (hours, location, and contact information), is 
all available by telephone, which is fully accessible to visually impaired 
users.
67
  Title III already ensures that the physical stores have been made 
accessible to visually impaired users.  Forcing Target.com to meet ADA 
requirements, especially when there are other methods of easily obtaining 
the same information, is also a misapplication of the nexus test. 
Moreover, when comparing the two cases, there are many websites that 
disability rights advocates would want covered under the nexus test that 
would simply be left out. For example, while Target.com would have to 
make changes because of its nexus to brick-and-mortar stores, 
Amazon.com would not have to make the same changes.  Amazon.com 
would be exempt from ADA application even though the impact on 
65. Id. at 956.
66. Id. at 954 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b) (2015)).
67. Id. at 956.
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disabled customers would be much worse than the impact on disabled 
customers of Target.com as none of Amazon’s services are available 
offline or in a physical location.  Application of the nexus test would give 
visually impaired users further access to services that already have physical 
locations, and thus are already required to provide accommodations in 
some sense.  On the other hand, it would do nothing to make services that 
are web-exclusive change their websites to become more accessible. In 
other words, the nexus test provides the benefits of the ADA where they 
are needed least and withholds them where they are needed most. 
Unpredictability in how the courts will apply the nexus test continue to 
exist has led to another problem—a lack of notice to website programmers 
and developers regarding when the ADA does or does not apply to their 
websites.  It is unclear whether websites fall under the label “place of 
public accommodation” at all, allowing for conflicting judicial 
interpretations.  If a court does not find the website itself to be a place of 
public accommodation, there is still a question of what judicially 
constitutes a nexus to a physical location, allowing for more varying 
judicial interpretation. 
C. The Problem with Varying Judicial Applications of the ADA
As this section shows, without clearer answers to both questions,
judicial interpretation may lead to further confusion and conflicting rulings.  
Some courts will rely only on statutory interpretation while others might 
apply the nexus test, without any uniformity in how the test is applied.  
This section looks specifically at recent conflicting rulings by federal 
district courts in Massachusetts and California applying the ADA to 
Netflix.com, an online provider of television and movies.  These 
conflicting rulings serve as an example of why varying judicial 
interpretation is problematic in giving notice, providing clarity on the law, 
and determining what exactly ADA web compliance entails. 
The National Association of the Deaf sued Netflix in the District of 
Massachusetts for failure to provide equal access to the “Watch Instantly” 
portion of the website.
68
  Netflix argued that the plaintiffs had failed to 
show how Netflix was a “place of public accommodation” under the 
ADA.
69
  The court rejected Netflix’s argument for three reasons in an 
opinion that did not even apply the nexus test. 
First, the court stated that failure to specifically mention websites in the 
ADA did not mean that Congress did not intend the ADA to adapt to 
68. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D. Mass. 2012).
69. Id. at 200.
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changes in technology.
70
  Second, the court stated that Congress did not 
intend to limit the ADA to specific examples, as evidenced by statements in 
the congressional record.
71
  Finally, the court ruled that even though 
individuals accessed Netflix privately, that did not prevent Netflix from 
being a place of public accommodation.
72
  Citing the Northern District of 
California’s decision in the Target case, the District of Massachusetts held 
that the ADA applies to the services “of” a place of public accommodation, 
not services “in” a place of public accommodation.
73
  Thus the court 
concluded that the Watch Instantly portion of the Netflix site was a place of 
public accommodation, as a service establishment, place of exhibition, or 
entertainment, and a rental establishment under the ADA.
74
  There was no 
need for the court to apply the nexus test as the court found the statute itself 
applied to online content. 
The next month, however, Netflix prevailed in a similar case in the 
Northern District of California, in a decision recently affirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit.
75
  In Cullen v. Netflix, plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit claiming 
Netflix promised to subtitle its streaming library, allowing plaintiffs to 
falsely rely on those statements and continue purchasing subscriptions.
76
  
Cullen also claimed that Netflix was a place of public accommodation 
under Title III of the ADA and that its failure to provide captioning on 
movies in a reasonable amount of time imposed a “deaf tax.”
77
  This barrier 
was arguably discriminatory because plaintiff and members of his class 
were forced to buy the DVD-by-mail plans (instead of the instant streaming 
plans) that were significantly more expensive compared to services offered 
70. Id. at 201.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. 101-485(II), at 108 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 391 (“[T]he Committee intends that the types of accommodation and services 
provided to individuals with disabilities, under all of the titles of this bill, should keep pace with 
the rapidly changing technology of the times.”). 
71. Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (“Congress did not intend to limit the ADA to the
specific examples listed in each category of public accommodations. Plaintiffs must show only 
that the web site falls within a general category listed under the ADA.”).  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 
101-116, at 56 (1990) (“[W]ithin each of these categories, the legislation only lists a few 
examples and then, in most cases, adds the phrase ‘other similar’ entities. The Committee intends
that the ‘other similar’ terminology should be construed liberally consistent with the intent of the
legislation . . . .”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 54 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 477 (“A person alleging discrimination does not have to prove that the entity
being charged with discrimination is similar to the examples listed in the definition. Rather, the 
person must show that the entity falls within the overall category.”).
72. Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Cullen II, 600 F. App’x 508, 509 (9th Cir. 2015).
76. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. (Cullen I), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
77. Id.
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to individuals who were not disabled.
78
  The District Court found that under 
Ninth Circuit precedent, websites are not places of public accommodation 
because they are not physical places.
79
  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
decision in a memorandum, stating that a place of public accommodation 




Within one month, two District Courts reached opposing decisions on 
whether Netflix is a place of public accommodation under the ADA.  The 
Massachusetts court did not even apply the nexus test, holding that 
websites were places of public accommodation in their own right.  The 
Northern District of California applied the nexus test and found that Netflix 
had no connection to a physical location.
81
  The same company is now left 
with two opposing decisions and no conclusion on how to determine if the 
ADA applies to its services and if so, under what circumstances.
82
  Outside 
of the confusion Netflix is experiencing, these divergent rulings create a 
problem of uncertainty and allowing plaintiffs to forum shop.  While these 
issues occur whenever a circuit split exists, this problem is particularly 
distinctive in an online context. Online businesses inevitably operate across 
state and circuit lines, whether they intend to or not.
83
  Any legally binding 
changes are difficult to apply without changing the entire website, 
regardless of where the user is located.  Even if a website wins an ADA 
suit in one location, one loss is enough to force major changes. 
Subsequent decisions have failed to clarify this important issue of ADA 
interpretation.  Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Cullen decision in 
April 2015, other courts have found websites to be places of public 
accommodation.  For example, the United States District Court for the 
District of Vermont, aware of the Ninth Circuit Cullen decision, ruled in 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1023 (referencing Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946,
952 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the ADA can only apply to a website when “there is a 
‘nexus’” between the conduct at issue and defendant’s physical location)); Young v. Facebook, 
Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing ADA claim against Facebook 
because Facebook operates only in cyberspace and thus is not a place of public accommodation as 
construed by the Ninth Circuit); Earll v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-00262-JF HRL, 2011 WL 
3955485, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) (holding that eBay’s website is not a place of public 
accommodation under the ADA). 
80. Cullen II, 600 F. App’x at 509.
81. Plaintiffs could have argued that the DVD mailing service constituted a physical service 
covered by the ADA. No court has ruled on that issue and it is not clear that Plaintiffs in the 
Cullen case made that argument.  
82. Netflix could also satisfy both courts by simply making their services accessible by 
visually impaired users. 
83. Servers are located in different states and online businesses generally do not
discriminate based on which states a customer is located in. 
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May 2015 that websites could be considered places of public 
accommodation in National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd.
84
  The 
Vermont District Court noted that the ADA is ambiguous and chose to 
resolve that ambiguity in favor of the Plaintiffs.
85
  The court also found that 
Scribd, a digital library subscription service, owned, leased, or operated a 
place of public accommodation because its services fell within the general 
categories listed in the ADA.
86
  Plaintiffs argued that the computer servers 
that Scribd utilized to provide its services also constituted a sufficient 
nexus to a physical place of public accommodation.
87
  The Vermont 
District Court stated that the Ninth Circuit Cullen decision relied on 
“cramped reasoning” and that it was also non-precedential.
88
  While no 
other circuit court has yet ruled on the matter, a split is clearly forming.  
Questions about ADA interpretation and application of the nexus test 
persist and lead to confusion for businesses operating in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
D. Going Beyond Rejection of the Nexus Test
The nexus test lacks clarity, has no clear purpose, and fails to provide
consistency in applying the ADA to online content.
89
  Courts should 
therefore reject the nexus test and instead interpret Title III of the ADA as 
applying to online content.  As seen above, the nexus test is a stop-gap 
measure taken from physical corollaries that just does not effectively apply 
to the internet. 
However, this interpretation by the courts is only part of the solution. 
Judicial decision-making will only apply piecemeal to websites as they are 
brought in front of a court.  While this is better than leaving visually 
impaired users without recourse, piecemeal changes are simply not 
enough.
90
  Court are not the correct venue to set forth guidelines on which 
84. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., No. 2:14-cv-162, 2015 WL 3454738, at *3 (D.
Vt. May 29, 2015). 
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id. at *3.
89. Modification of the test is also not the answer.  Broadening what constitutes a “nexus”
would still not provide any clarity or uniformity on what web compliance with the ADA requires. 
There would still be a variety of decisions regarding what is needed to comply with Title III and 
when a website has met those requirements.  As discussed in Part IV, a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking would better address many of these questions.  It is also unclear what the purpose of 
the nexus test would be if it was broadened to the extent this paper calls for it to change. Under 
the statutory interpretation suggested here, the nexus requirement would be removed as the ADA 
simply does not require it and it is contrary to public policy. 
90. If courts all start ruling that Title III of the ADA applies to online content, websites may 
start complying without waiting to be sued; however, as noted in Part III, that is not enough to fix 
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specific websites are places of public accommodation, which sites qualify 
for the undue burden exception, and what changes are specifically needed 
for websites to comply with Title III. 
While rejection of the “nexus test” is necessary to begin bringing 
courts together regarding Title III and web accessibility, the DOJ is best 
equipped to make broad and lasting changes.  There is a need for concrete 
and clear regulatory statements on when and how places of public 
accommodation that exist online should meet the requirements set forth in 
the ADA.  As long as courts recognize the ambiguity of ADA statutory 
language in its relation to online content, they would sufficiently give the 
DOJ concrete regulatory authority to speak on the issue.
91
 
Even if courts are clear and interpret Title III as applying to websites, 
the DOJ would still need to speak on the issue at some point.  Conflicting 
rulings from prior courts have just led some companies to ignore any 
possible application of the ADA to online content until there is clarity, as 
seen with continued cases against Netflix.  Even the courts that do require 
accessibility for visually impaired users have not set clear standards for 
what constitutes accessibility and have failed to specify the timeframe in 
which accessibility is required. 
There are multiple reasons that agencies are better suited to make such 
changes instead of the courts.  First, the DOJ is likely to have more 
expertise on issues regarding technical standards than a judge.  The 
“agency expertise” argument is fairly common and is particularly true in 
industries that require scientific or technical understanding applicable to a 
large number of industries.
92
  Especially when a statute is ambiguous, 
resolution of that ambiguity requires policy judgments that are not for 
courts, but for political branches.
93
  Second, agency rulemaking allows for 
the problem.  There will still be a lack of clarity regarding what is required to meet Title III in 
terms of changes to websites and website code.  For this reason, a judicial interpretation in favor 
of online content as part of Title III is not enough. 
91. See supra note 42.
92. See e.g. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, 
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the 
provision would be in a better position to do so . . . .  Judges are not experts in the field . . . . 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really 
centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within 
a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987); David B. Spence & Frank 
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); Wendy E. 
Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2028–30 (2015). 
93. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989). 
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political accountability without being mired in the inefficiencies of 
Congress and courts.  Notice-and-comment rulemaking allows for both ex 
ante and ex post participation by interested constituents and lobbying 
groups without making any agency beholden to a specific group of 
people.
94
  While judicial oversight is still available as necessary, decisions 
can be made without an action being brought. 
Third, agencies have more flexibility than courts in responding to 
changing conditions and expanding (or retracting) the scope of regulation 
accordingly.
95
  This is especially necessary when discussing technological 
regulation, as technology changes without much notice and as seen above, 
can otherwise only be addressed when plaintiffs bring an action before 
courts.  As discussed below, flexible nonbinding guidelines issued by the 
DOJ would allow for uniformity on how websites should be changed 
without holding companies to outdated standards as technology changes.  
Courts simply do not have the expertise or flexibility to make 
comprehensive changes to ADA policy and also cannot make nonbinding 
suggestions that can be changed over time.  Such flexibility is especially 
valuable when the effects of a policy are still somewhat uncertain and the 
viability of making accessible changes will increase over time.
96
 
As seen in the next section, regulatory guidelines could provide more 
clarity than the current conflicting court rulings on access to constantly 
changing technology.  Regulation could also provide an actual timeline for 
change and parameters in which that change should occur.  Regulation 
would also fairly account for necessary exemptions and cost-related issues 
that judges may not be best equipped to discuss and decide.  Any positive 
impact from statutory interpretation in favor of regulating online content 
and a rejection of the nexus test would only be enhanced by DOJ regulation 
and clarity in implementation. 
IV. Administrative Issues in Adapting the Americans with
Disabilities Act 
While courts have not provided a consistent answer to the question of 
whether websites are covered under the ADA, until recently a clear 
administrative answer was lacking as well.  The ADA assigns to the 
Department of Justice, specifically the Attorney General, the task of issuing 
ADA Title III regulations under 42 USC § 12186(b).
97
  The DOJ issues 
94. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 136 (2005). 
95. See e.g., Scalia, supra note 93, at 517.
96. See Stephenson supra note 94, at 139–43.
97. 42 USC § 12186(b) (2015).
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regulations regarding ADA accessibility requirements for governmental 
entities, recipients of federal funding, and places of public 
accommodation.
98
  This section evaluates the evolution of DOJ 
interpretations with regard to web accessibility, specifically considering the 
recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that suggests specific 
changes to Title III. 
The DOJ first took a position on the application of the ADA to 
websites in a brief filed in a 2000 case, Hooks v. OKBridge.
99
  In Hooks, 
plaintiff alleged an online gaming site had terminated his membership 
because of his bi-polar disorder and related disabilities.
100
  The company 
operated only online and had no nexus to a physical location.
101
  The DOJ 
filed an amicus brief when the case was before the 5th Circuit.  This was 
the first time the DOJ publicly noted its interpretation of the ADA.  The 
DOJ stated that the ADA was not limited to services provided “at” a place 
of public accommodation, but rather could apply to any service offered by 
a place “of” public accommodation, even if that service was offered 
offsite.
102
  This interpretation showed that the DOJ already believed that 
Title III applied to web content as long as the service offered online was 
offered by a place of public accommodation. 
In April 2010, the House Judiciary Subcommittee held hearings on the 
application of the ADA in the digital age, furthering the above 
interpretation.
103
  The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
Civil Rights for the DOJ, Professor Samuel Bagenstos, testified that access 
to electronic technology is increasingly becoming an issue of civil rights, 
especially considering employment and educational opportunities available 
online.
104
  He reiterated the position the DOJ took in the Hooks brief that 
websites of private entities that are public accommodation must be fully 
accessible to individuals with disabilities.
105
 
The testimony of Professor Bagenstos and others during the hearing did 
not rely on nexus to a physical facility and considered any websites that fell 
under the definition of a place of public accommodation as covered by the 
ADA.  Professor Bagenstos specifically stated, “we in the Federal 
98. Joshua A. Stein & Kristine K. Huggins, House Judiciary Subcommittee Conducts
Hearing on ADA Issues in the Digital Age, LEXOLOGY (May 26, 2010), http://www.lexo 
logy.com/library/detail.aspx?g=73d4b92d-1c28-49ba-bd10-afb799e05200. 
99. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Hooks v. OKBridge,
Inc., 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50891). 
100. Id. at 3–4.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id. at 5.




236 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:2 
government must . . . make certain that individuals with disabilities are not 
excluded from the virtual world in the same way that they were historically 
excluded from ‘brick and mortar’ facilities,” demonstrating the DOJ’s 
belief that the nexus test may not even be necessary.
106
  His testimony did 
not clarify what sort of exceptions would be available to business making 
websites accessible to visually impaired users, nor did it address the impact 
this would have on small businesses.  It provided vague guidance regarding 
what standards the DOJ would consider adequate for web accessibility.  
That guidance would later result in an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking. 
In July 2010, the DOJ published an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; 
Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local 
Government Entities and Public Accommodations.
107
  The DOJ reiterated 
that Title III of the ADA applied to website accessibility even though the 
ADA did not specifically mention the Internet.
108
  Specifically, the DOJ 
stated that the rationale for the ANPRM was “to explore whether 
rulemaking would be helpful in providing guidance as to how covered 
entities could meet their pre-existing obligations to make their websites 
accessible.”
109
  These statements made clear that the DOJ considered 
websites that fall under the ADA enumerated categories to be places of 
public accommodation under Title III without the need to show a nexus to 
physical facilities. 
The ANPRM also included some guidance on how the ADA applied to 
websites of public entities and possible standards for website 
accessibility.
110
  While the specifics of the ANPRM and the results of the 
notice-and-comment period will be discussed below in Section IV, the DOJ 
has not moved on from the ANPRM to the next traditional phase for rule-
making, the Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”).
111
  The date for 
the proposed NPRM has been delayed continuously from 2012 to 2018, 
essentially leaving any changes to the new administration.
112
  The DOJ has 
not published any statement regarding why the NPRM phase has not begun 
106. Id.
107. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and
Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 




111. Kenneth J Yerkes et al., U.S. Department of Justice Further Delays ADA Title III
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yet or what is causing a hold in further progress in rulemaking regarding 
web accessibility.  The only statement is that it has moved to the “long-
term action” list.
113
  Regardless, without rule-making or even a notice of 
proposed rule-making, the ANPRM does not hold much weight in a court 
of law.
114
  It serves mostly as a way for the DOJ to ask questions and take 
into account the views of parties affected by possible future changes. 
Meanwhile, the DOJ has continued to interpret the ADA to include 
online content in the context of enforcements.  In November 2010, the DOJ 
entered into a consent decree with Hilton Hotels.
115
  Hilton Hotels was 
required under the consent decree to make its online reservations system 
accessible to visually impaired users and to update information on its 
website about accommodation available to guests with disabilities.
116
  This 
was the first time a DOJ consent decree had included a website when 
discussing ADA requirements.  The Hilton Hotels consent decree is a 
further indication that the DOJ sees websites as fully covered under the 
ADA, without any necessity for a nexus test. 
In November 2014, the DOJ reached a settlement with Peapod.com, an 
online grocery and food supply delivery service.
117
  Unlike the Hilton 
Hotels example above, Peapod.com did not have a nexus to a physical 
place of public accommodation.  Nonetheless, the Peapod.com settlement 
required that Peapod make both its websites and mobile applications 
accessible to disabled users.
118
  The DOJ required the companies to comply 
with third-party web accessibility standards set by the Worldwide Web 
113. Id.
114. Some observers have speculated that confusion over which specific standards to use and
concerns of corporations that conduct business online are largely to blame; however, there is not 
much evidence to corroborate that at this point.  Regardless, those observers note that the need for 
the ANPRM to move forward is high.  See Lainey Feingold, Digital Accessibility Legal Update, 
L. OFFICE OF LAINEY FEINGOLD (Dec. 15, 2015), http://lflegal.com/2015/12/legal-update-
december15/.
115. Justice Department Reaches Agreement with Hilton Worldwide Inc. Over ADA 
Violations at Hilton Hotels and Major Hotel Chains Owned by Hilton, DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE 
OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-
agreement-hilton-worldwide-inc-over-ada-violations-hilton-hotels); see also Consent Decree, 
United States v. Hilton Worldwide Inc. (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.ada.gov/hilton/hilton.htm.  
116. Id.
117. Settlement Agreement between United States and Peapod, LLC, DJ 202-63-169 (Nov.
10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/file/163956/download; see also Justice Department Enters into 
a Settlement Agreement with Peapod to Ensure that Peapod Grocery Delivery Website Is 
Accessible to Individuals with Disabilities, DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 17, 
2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-enters-settlement-agreement-peapod-
ensure-peapod-grocery-delivery-website.   
118. Justice Department Enters into a Settlement Agreement with Peapod to Ensure that
Peapod Grocery Delivery Website is Accessible to Individuals with Disabilities, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE: OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 117. 
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Consortium (discussed below in Part IV), indicating that the DOJ considers 
those guidelines to be an appropriate standard for web accessibility.
119
  The 
settlement also required Peapod.com to work with third-party content 
providers that also meet similar accessibility standards unless it would 
create an undue burden, an exception already written into the ADA.
120
 
The Peapod.com settlement is just one example of multiple settlement 
agreements the DOJ has entered into regarding web accessibility.  These 
settlements include provisions such as retaining independent accessibility 
consultants to assist in making websites and mobile applications accessible, 
adoption of an accessibility policy, designation of a website accessibility 
coordinator, and annual training of website content personnel.
121
  
Furthermore, in early 2015, the DOJ filed two statements of interests in 
cases by the National Association of the Deaf, opposing Harvard 
University and MIT’s lack of web accessibility for online programming.
122
  
The DOJ specifically stated that existing law already requires such content 
to be accessible.  However, critics have noted that even though the DOJ 
claims the statute is clear on this matter, claims by private parties 
challenging the accessibility of websites is increasing and websites are still 
not changing their accessibility policies on their own.
123
 
Over time and especially considering DOJ action after the ANPRM, 
the DOJ has favored interpretation of the ADA as already including online 
content without the need to prove a nexus to a physical location, which is in 
line with the statutory interpretation suggested above.
124
  The DOJ states 
that websites now have a preexisting obligation to ensure that content is 
119. The specific requirements of the standards are discussed in section IV below.  There are
concerns that the DOJ has adopted the standards without notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
bypassing any method of political accountability and holding companies to those standards.  This 
is yet another reason the ANPRM is needed. 
120. Justice Department Enters into a Settlement Agreement with Peapod to Ensure that
Peapod Grocery Delivery Website is Accessible to Individuals with Disabilities, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE: OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 117. 
121. Id.
122. Justice Department Reaches Settlement with edX Inc., Provider of Massive Open Online
Courses, to Make its Website, Online Platform and Mobile Applications Accessible Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-edx-inc-provider-massive-o 
pen-online-courses-make-its.  
123. See Feingold, supra note 114.
124. In the 2010 ANPRM, the DOJ still stated that public accommodations with inaccessible 
websites could still comply with the ADA by providing an equal degree of access through 
alternative means, such as the telephone.  First, this seems to differentiate between public 
accommodation and websites, making for an argument that the DOJ in 2010 did not think 
websites themselves were places of public accommodation.  Furthermore, it also shows a relaxed 
attitude towards what changes were actually necessary to provide adequate accommodations for 
visually impaired users. 
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accessible to visually impaired users.  However, due to the continuous 
litigation on this matter, the DOJ should clarify the enforceability and 
scope of this view through further rulemaking.  The DOJ continues to 
maintain that although the rulemaking process is incomplete, web-based 
services are still places of public accommodation under the ADA.
125
  
Further clarification and a renewed notice-and-comment process for ADA 
application to web accessibility would allow for effective guidance and 
change for visually impaired uses. 
V. Current Provisions of the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on Web Accessibility 
The ANPRM provides the most recent codified version of DOJ 
interpretations of the ADA.  This section will unravel the specific 
interpretations in the 2010 ANPRM, discussing its shortcomings.  Finally, 
this section will provide suggestions for further changes the DOJ can 
include in the NPRM to address concerns and issues with the 2010 
ANPRM. 
A. 2010 ANPRM Provisions
1. Accessibility Standards
The first significant element of the ANPRM concerns the accessibility
standards that should apply to websites, meaning what website developers 
specifically or generally need to accomplish in order to comply with Title 
III.
126
  On this issue, the ANPRM explicitly considers accessibility 
standards developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C),
127
 an 
international standards organization for the World Wide Web founded by 
Tim Berners-Lee.
128
  The W3C attempts to standardize the code used in 
website development to remove inconsistencies in webpage access and 
display.
129
  The W3C is made up of 319 members, including businesses, 
nonprofit organizations, universities, governmental entities, and 
individuals.
130
  In accordance with its mission, the W3C has created the 
Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”) to create international accessibility 
125. DOJ ANPRM on Web Accessibility, supra note 107.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international community that develops
open standards to ensure the long-term growth of the Web.  The W3C is led by Tim Berners-Lee, 
regarded as the founder of the World Wide Web. World Wide Web Consortium, About W3C, 
WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
129. W3C Mission, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM http://www.w3.org/Consortium/
mission (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
130. Id.
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guidelines to encourage developers to make web content more accessible to 
users with disabilities. 
The guidelines, formally known as the Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (“WCAG”), are technical standards that are organized around 
four principles: making websites perceivable, operable, understandable, 
and robust for impaired users.
131
  There are three levels of WCAG 
guidelines (A, AA, and AAA) to measure the success of a webpage, with A 
referring to the minimal necessary standards.
132
  The WCAG 2.0 
guidelines, published in 2010, provide basic guidelines and also technical 
materials to suggest techniques developers may use to develop accessible 
content.
133
  There are also less technical materials, such as a guide, 
“Understanding WCAG 2.0,” for people who want to learn more about the 
guidelines at a basic level.
134
  The technical guides also provide 
information based on types of content, e.g., images, links, tables, etc.
135
  
The guidelines also contain portions related to mobile accessibility
136
 and 
possible guidelines for rich-media and newer web-based technologies.
137
 
The ANPRM considered whether the WCAG guidelines were 
appropriate guidelines for the DOJ to apply in regulating web 
accessibility,
138
 and if so, which level would be required.
139
  W3C itself 
does not advise AAA compliance with the WCAG guidelines because 
many websites would simply not be able to satisfy the technical 
requirements.  The other questions the ANPRM asked include how the 
DOJ should deal with future changes to the WCAG guidelines and at what 
131. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Overview, WEB ACCESSIBILITY
INITIATIVE, http://www.w3.org/WAI/intro/wcag (last updated Oct. 2, 2012). 
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Understanding WCAG 2.0: W3C Working Group Note, WORLD WIDE WEB 
CONSORTIUM (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.w3.org/TR/2015/NOTE-UNDERSTANDING-
WCAG20-20150226/.  
135. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Overview, supra note 131.
136. Mobile Accessibility, WEB ACCESSIBILITY INITIATIVE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.w3.
org/WAI/mobile/. 
137. WAI-ARIA Overview, WEB ACCESSIBILITY INITIATIVE (June 12, 2014), http://www.w3.
org/WAI/intro/aria.php. 
138. The DOJ also pointed to section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as a potential
basis for technical guidelines governing web accessibility.  Section 508 requires Federal 
government agency websites to comply with specific standards for user accessibility.  The section 
508 standards have recently been brought into compliance with the WCAG standards and 
therefore are not mentioned further in this article.  The WCAG standards are still considered the 
gold standard in terms of writing. Comparison Table of WCAG 2.0 to Existing 508 Standards, 
UNITED STATES ACCESS BOARD (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.access-board.gov/guidelines-and-
standards/communications-and-it/about-the-ict-refresh/background/comparison-table-of-wcag2-to 
-existing-508-standards.
139. DOJ ANPRM on Web Accessibility, supra note 107.
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point compliance with new guidelines should be required.
140
  
Understanding the technical requirements is critical to understanding what 
standards businesses will be held to under Title III as it applies to online 
content. 
2. Coverage Standards and User-Generated Content
The second portion of the ANPRM concerns coverage limitations and
the scope of ADA application to websites.  The DOJ explicitly states here 
that Title III does reach websites of any entities that “provide goods or 
services that fall within the 12 categories of public accommodations as 
defined by the statute.”
141
  The DOJ also notes that it is primarily focused 
on accommodations that operate exclusively or through some type of 
presence on the Web, meaning that it is focusing primarily on websites that 
would fail the nexus test.
142
  The DOJ is also considering language that 
indicates that content created or even posted by users for “personal, 
noncommercial use” will not be covered, even if the website belongs to a 
place of public accommodation.
143
  Another alternative is that such public 
accommodations would not be liable if user-generated content was not 
accessible as long as the users had some ability to make the posts 
accessible if they so desired. 
A corollary to the user-generated content issue is whether online 
marketplaces, such as eBay, will be required to make their postings 
accessible. The DOJ suggests a distinction between informal and 
occasional private sellers and legally established business entities.
144
  The 
business entities would be responsible for making their online content 
accessible to users with disabilities. The final scope issue the ANPRM 
considers is whether a public accommodation using another site (for 
payment processing or otherwise) would have to require the associated 
website to make information accessible.  The ANPRM suggests that the 
public accommodation could be liable for other sites if it requires 
consumers to use the other site.
145
  The DOJ asks for feedback on the scope 






143. “This would include individual participation in popular online communities, forums, or
networks in which people upload personal videos or photos or engage in exchanges with other 
users.” Id. 
144. DOJ ANPRM on Web Accessibility, supra note 107.
145. The ANPRM also suggests that this would apply regardless of whether the original site 
operated or controlled any aspect of the linked site. 
146. DOJ ANPRM on Web Accessibility, supra note 107.
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3. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Small Business Impact
Finally, the ANPRM focuses on cost-benefit issues, especially since
the proposed regulatory action would be “economically significant” and 
thus must include a formal regulatory analysis of the economic costs and 
benefits.
147
  The DOJ asks for advice regarding how to estimate the number 
of public accommodations and then how to calculate the costs to each in 
implementing the new ADA regulations.
148
  Here, the DOJ is concerned 
with small entities, including businesses, nonprofit organizations, and 
smaller government jurisdictions and what impact the regulations would 
have.  The same issue applies to calculating the benefits of the new 
guidelines.  The DOJ asks for further commentary regarding potential 
unintended consequences of their interpretation of the ADA, such as the 
impact on video providers.
149
  The ANPRM hopes to elicit responses that 
would warn the DOJ of unintended issues that could be assessed in drafting 
the new guidelines. 
Because the ANPRM considers so many facets, the DOJ has received a 
large number of comments on which standards to enforce, how to enforce 
them, and what exceptions will be necessary to minimize any unintended 
consequences and allow for continuing innovation.  There are issues of 
user-generated and rich-media content that need to be addressed, as well as 
legal concerns regarding Chevron deference and the First Amendment.  As 
will become clear in the next section, the DOJ should consider multiple 
exceptions and clarifications before implementing any set of rules 
regarding the ADA and web accessibility.  These suggestions will go 
beyond the stated scope of the ANPRM and may complicate the system but 
they are critical to ensure efficiency, fairness, and continued innovation. 
B. Challenges Faced by the 2010 ANPRM Provisions
The ANPRM contains many provisions that would ultimately help
provide access to visually impaired users; however, there are problems in 
this five-year-old document that the DOJ should consider before issuing the 
NPRM on web accessibility.  The DOJ should reconsider which specific 
enforcement standards should be put in place and place a stronger emphasis 
on the existing language of the ADA that exempts places of public 
accommodation from making changes under the ADA if it would be an 
undue burden. 
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1. Weaknesses in Enforcement Standards
As mentioned in Section IV.A, the DOJ is currently planning to
regulate web accessibility based on the WCAG technical guidelines.  The 
DOJ also noted in the ANPRM that technical standards may not provide 
the best solution and instead there may be a need for performance 
standards.
150
  This paper argues that a hybrid approach is necessary to 
ensure the purpose of the ADA is met and there is no undue burden on web 
developers. 
The ANPRM itself does not note what the difference would be between 
the two types of standards.  Performance standards are broad, functional 
statements that contain three parts: the requirement, the criteria, and the 
test.
151
  Performance standards do not focus on how the requirement is met 
but just what overall goals should be accomplished.
152
  For example, 
performance standards would focus on what the end-user would experience 
when looking at a site but would not prescribe how that would occur.  
Technical standards focus on what specifically needs to be done in terms of 
code and placement in order to provide accessibility.  Technical standards, 
like the WCAG, attempt to codify what basic methods should be used in 
implementing changes for accessibility and are not necessarily focused on 
the end result. 
The public comments to the ANPRM regarding performance and 
technical standards range from suggesting just technical standards or just 
performance standards to suggesting a mix of the two.
153
  The reason some 
prefer technical standards is that performance standards can be difficult to 
measure and are not “specific, clear, objective and easy” for developers to 
perform.
154
  Technical criteria would also provide useful help to less 
proficient web developers rather than forcing them to seek outside help to 
determine what exactly would meet the ADA requirements.  Proponents of 
performance standards argue that flexibility is necessary because new 
technology will keep growing and technical standards are difficult to 
change. 
2. Strength in Combining Performance and Technical Standards
This paper contends that performance and technical standards should
not be mutually exclusive but should instead be used together.  
150. Id.
151. Laura Corcoran, ADA and the Internet: Standardizing the Accessibility of Web Sites, 
SELECTEDWORKS 16 (May 9, 2011), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000 
&context=laura_corcoran). 
152. Id. at 17.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 17–18.
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Performance standards can provide a practical view of who must be able to 
use each website and how a visually impaired user should be able to 
successfully navigate the page.  Technical standards should only serve as 
non-binding examples and guidelines regarding which methods will be 
most effective in meeting performance standards.
155
 
Performance standards focus on the user instead of on the technology, 
allowing the technology to change without a need for new guidelines with 
each change.  There may be elements of a page that technically would be 
difficult to regulate, such as videos, tables, and images; however, 
performance standards would focus on the overall experience for the 
visually impaired user instead of forcing each element of a page to be 
accessible when that may not even be possible.  Meanwhile, technical 
standards could function akin to DOJ interpretive guidance documents 
instead of full-scale regulations.  The technical standards could easily be 
changed since they only serve a guiding function.  This would ensure that 
less “technically savvy” developers would still have examples and 
technical standards to guide them without the need to constantly update 
standards through a formal process. 
Performance standards would allow for flexibility and a focus on the 
user, ensuring that the ADA’s purpose was met and that visually impaired 
users could access content in a reasonable manner.  The technical 
standards, most likely from the WCAG, could provide guidance to ensure 
that there were examples of what would pass ADA regulations.
156
  If they 
were non-binding, the technical standards could be changed without notice-
and-comment proceedings, allowing for flexibility and incorporation of 
new technologies.
157
  This is especially critical as the hardware and 
software to provide access to impaired users is improving every year.  If 
the DOJ were to implement only technical standards, it would force web 
developers to code for older technology even though newer and better 
options may be available. 
3. Undue Burden and Narrowing the Scope of the ANPRM
Title III of the ADA currently contains a provision that states that a
place of public accommodation is exempt from meeting the requirements 
of the ADA if taking such steps would “fundamentally alter the nature of 
155. Id.;sSee also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like – Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1311, 1312–16 (June 1992). 
156. This may be improper delegation of authority to a private entity; however, this paper
does not consider the implications of using such a model as the legal issues with such delegation 
have yet to be fully understood. 
157. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 USCA § 551 (1995).
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the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being 
offered” or “would result in an undue burden.”
158
  An “undue burden” is 
defined as a “significant difficulty or expense.”
159
  The ADA aims to 
minimize the cost of accessibility if it would create an excessive hardship 
for businesses.  In the physical context, “undue burden” still remains a 
murky concept that is slowly being clarified by case law.
160
 
Moving from the physical world to the digital world would mean that 
many of the considerations of what constitutes an undue burden might 
change or might not translate over as well. To ensure that the same 
murkiness does not occur with regard to web accessibility and defining an 
“undue burden,” the DOJ should include guidance on what constitutes an 
undue burden in the digital world. Currently, the ANPRM does not even 
mention undue burden and there is no consideration of how that language 
would change after notice-and-comment rulemaking.
161
  As seen in the 
below examples, there are a few types of content that might be exempt due 
to the excessive hardship required to become ADA compliant. 
4. User-Generated Content and Marketplaces
Due to the prevalence of user-generated content and the constant
addition of new ways of interacting online, the scope of the web 
accessibility regulations should be narrowed more than the ANPRM 
suggests.  This section explores exceptions that should be included in the 
DOJ’s rulemaking on the ADA and web accessibility and what problems 
may persist even after DOJ regulatory change. 
As already noted in the ANPRM, user-generated content should be 
exempt from accessibility standards, largely because content providers 
would face a large and sometimes impossible burden in attempting to 
recode every user response, including images, gifs, video, or other non-text 
methods of posting.
162
  This sort of exemption would be justified under the 
undue burden clause of the ADA but stating it specifically would provide 
more uniformity and clarity.  Online marketplaces fall in an odd mix 
between user-generated content from private individuals and content from 
158. 42 USC § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2015).
159. 28 C.F.R. 36.104 (2003).  The DOJ considers several factors in determining whether an
accommodation creates an undue burden on a place of public accommodation, including the 
“nature and cost of the action needed” and “the overall financial resources of the site.”  Id.; see 
also 28 C.F.R. 36.303(b)(1) (2003). 
160. Ronda K. O’Donnell & Lee C. Durivage, Undue Hardship, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
(June 14, 2011), http://www.marshalldennehey.com/media/pdf-articles/O%20231%20by%20R 
.%20O%27Donnell%20%26%20L.%20Durivage%206.14.11.pdf (citing multiple cases that 
consider different factors in addressing the meaning of an undue burden).  
161. DOJ ANPRM on Web Accessibility, supra note 107.
162. Id.
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commercial entities.  The ANPRM argues that the line should be drawn 
between legally established business entities, which would have to be ADA 
compliant, and informal sellers who are not legally business owners.
163
 
While this standard does provide a clear line of who does or does not 
need to meet the regulations, it does lead to a somewhat perverse result.  
Businesses that are not registered, such as individual shops on Etsy.com, 
are often the sole method of income for an individual.  Etsy.com runs on 
user-generated posting of goods in each Etsy “shop.”  Under the ANPRM, 
a small business in a physical location that may make less than an Etsy 
shop online will be forced to ensure ADA accessibility because they 
require a legal business license.
164
  Meanwhile, online “shop” owners may 
not have to comply.  There is no clear response to this other than pointing 
to the text of the ADA that allows for exemptions based on an “undue 
burden” for small businesses.
165
  Regulating all online business would 
otherwise err into drawing lines between businesses where no clear lines 
can in fact be drawn. 
Another example of a need for scope change is YouTube.  Since 2010, 
YouTube has become more commercial, with ads being shown before 
videos.  Furthermore, multiple commercial entities, such as movie and 
recording studios, use YouTube in order to upload music videos and movie 
trailers for publicity.  While they are not charging for YouTube views, 
these videos often contain links to websites where users can buy the 
product for themselves.  Even if the user-generated content is owned by a 
commercial entity, it would be unreasonable to expect that Google and 
YouTube would have to provide different ways to make each ad or video 
accessible.  On the other end of the spectrum, Google is profiting from the 
ads and would therefore profit from not having to enforce web accessibility 
standards.
166
  Some of this might be covered under the “undue burden” 
exemption but further clarity on content providers that shift between use-
generated content and commercial content may also be needed. 
5. Rich Media and Mobile Devices
Another area where a scope change is necessary concerns the type of
media being used on the website.  If the webpage has a large amount of 
rich-media, meaning videos and images, the DOJ should specify how 
accessible each element must be.  This is particularly important for social 
networking sites, like Facebook and Instagram, which contain large 
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 42 USC § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2015).
166. This is a problem that, as of now, does not have a clear solution.
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amounts of rich media posted by multiple users.  There are two possible 
solutions to this issue.  The first solution to this is including performance 
standards instead of just technical standards.  The technical guidelines 
would still provide clear ways in which rich-media content could be 
accessible while the performance standards would ensure that web 
developers would not have to go above and beyond for every piece of 
content on a webpage. 
The second solution to the rich media issue could also potentially 
address the commercialized user-generated content issue mentioned in the 
paragraph above.  Sites with large amounts of rich media or even user-
generated content would simply be required to provide tools to users that 
would allow users to make their own content web accessible.  Users on 
Facebook or YouTube would have the option to add commentary into the 
code for their photo or video (or whatever other media).  This commentary 
would be accessible by advanced text-to-speech readers for visually 
impaired users and would explain, to some degree, the content shown on 
the screen.  The burden on companies like YouTube and Facebook would 
be to create a mechanism for individual users to add more accessible 
commentary to rich media content; however, these companies would not be 
required to make all of the content accessible themselves, removing any 
“undue burden” that they may otherwise face. 
The final issue of scope concerns web-based devices that include 
access to places of public accommodation.  The ANPRM does not mention 
mobile applications although in 2014, the DOJ did comment on the need 
for applications to fall under the ADA as well.
167
  The concern with mobile 
applications is that they include everything from interactive games and 
social media to basic mobile needs such as telephone services.  While 
mobile devices are still used by visually impaired users, most applications 
connected to places of public accommodation do have online versions 
available.  The DOJ should state that if one method of online content is 
available for visually impaired users, that should suffice until mobile reader 
technology improves.  Restrictions on mobile content accessibility should 
require a separate approach as technology use increases and there is a 
greater need for guidance.
168
 
While there are other problems with the ANPRM as it exists now, the 
ones discussed above should be fixed to ensure the feasibility of any related 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Otherwise, any notice-and-comment 
167. Minh Vu, Justice Department Targets Websites, Mobile Apps, and POS Devices, ADA 
TITLE III NEWS & INSIGHTS (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2014/04/justice-depart 
ment-targets-websites-mobile-apps-and-pos-devices/.  
168. See Mobile Accessibility, WEB ACCESSIBILITY INITIATIVE, supra note 136 (regarding 
mobile accessibility guidelines).* 
  
248 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:2 
rulemaking will either be too lax or too harsh, either circumventing the 
purpose of the ADA or forcing too many websites to claim an undue 
burden exemption due to cost. 
VI. Conclusion
There is currently a lack of consensus on if and how Title III of the 
ADA applies to online content.  Web accessibility is critical for visually-
impaired users to fully participate in society.  Instead of using the nexus 
test, courts should find in favor of applying the ADA to online content or at 
least, note the ambiguity of the statute instead of ruling that the statute 
simply does not apply.  However, such rulings by courts will not do enough 
to create usable standards for web accessibility for visually impaired users. 
DOJ rulemaking can offer substantial and direct guidance and clarity.  
Forcing the Department of Justice to clarify its position and to provide 
actual standards will lead to more effective change in the field of web 
accessibility and will cut down on the impact of perverse results from 
recent judicial decisions.  An improved Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
and eventual regulation will provide clear and adequate notice to online 
content providers, users, and courts moving forward. 
